Marshall's 'trees' and the global 'forest': were 'giant redwoods different? by Hannah, L.
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 318
January 1997
MARSHALL’S ‘TREES’ AND THE GLOBAL ‘FOREST’:
WERE ‘GIANT REDWOODS’ DIFFERENT?
L. HANNAH
ABSTRACT
This essay examines the fate of the 100 largest industrial firms in the
world in 1912 over the period to 1995.  Disappearance and decline
were the most common outcomes, but a few outstanding performers —
firms like Burmah / BP and Procter & Gamble — left descendants eight
or nine times their initial size, in “real stock exchange price” terms.
There were no significant differences between the performance of giant
German, British and American firms, other than a slightly greater
tendency to disappear among American firms.  The convergence of
national performance of giant firms is probably related to converging
strategies and structures of such firms in advanced industrial countries.
Long-run differences in national economic performance in the
twentieth century, at least among industrial leaders, are rooted
elsewhere: in non-industrial sectors of the economy or smaller
industrial firms.  The analysis of the long-run evolution of giant firms
also suggests that, while firms in “old” industries on average performed
worse than those in “new” ones, the 1912 population included equal
numbers of each and there was, in any case, greater variability of
outcomes within than between industries.  No simple formula enables
us to discriminate ex ante between long-run corporate success and
failure, for reasons inherent in the nature of modern corporate
capitalism’s success as an economic system.
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L. HANNAH
1. THE PROBLEM
How can we generalise from the case studies in this volume?  How
representative are they?  Are alternative post hoc rationalisations
equally plausible?  In altered circumstances, (inherently unpredictable
at the time) would different outcomes have been observed?  Many of
these questions are unanswerable  the lessons of the cases are often sui
generis, the counterfactuals are unknowable, the data for comparable
firms are unobtainable or no such firms exist.  This does not mean that
cases cannot enrich our understanding, but it has sometimes led
frustrated business historians to claim rather more for their craft than
is justifiable.  This essay reviews some of their problems and suggests
how we might focus their research on areas where significant progress
is most likely.  It addresses, particularly, the experience of large firms,
in the context of  differences in national industrial systems and
performance outcomes.
Writing at the time that large corporations were being built on an
unprecedented scale, Alfred Marshall felt the need to modify his
favoured analogy of firms in the economy as trees in the forest.  In his
first (1890) edition of the Principles of Economics, he had suggested
that, like trees in the forest, there would be large and small firms, but
“sooner or later age tells on them all”.  However, by the 6th edition of
1910 he was cautioning that his earlier sentence could appropriately be
put in the past tense, for “vast joint stock companies ... often stagnate,
but do not readily die” (Marshall, (ed Guillebaud) 1961, p.316).
Marshall  was an acute observer of the contemporary real economy in
Britain, Germany and America: he would not have modified his view
without substantial evidence that the Giant Redwoods he observed in
these economies were qualitatively different from the nineteenth
century firms on which he had based his generalisations of two decades
earlier.
2The work of business historians — even those who profoundly disagree
with Marshallian perspectives on industrial economics — has generally
concurred with his view that something new was happening in the
twentieth century corporate world.  Chandler (1990) and Lazonick
(1991), for example, have suggested that large corporations, by the
beginning of this century, built significant technical, organisational and
marketing capabilities, thus acquiring often unassailable first-mover
advantages, so that they generally still dominate the global oligopolies
they first created.  The purpose of this essay is not to question whether
they (and Marshall) were right, for they clearly were, but rather to
establish the degree to which the traditional analogy of rising and
declining trees, or the implied new one of Giant Redwoods with a
charmed life, perhaps of centuries rather than decades, best describes
the reality of the modern corporate economy.  We will suggest that —
on the evidence of the century so far — there is some life in the old
view and that understanding where and why helps us diagnose the
nature, strengths and limits of dynamic organisational capabilities.
Scepticism about corporate capabilities is not universal among
business historians.  The tendency to over-emphasise successes (and to
rationalise them ex post) — what has been criticised as the “Whig”
misinterpretation in the context of political history — is chronically
endemic among them, as it is also among businessmen and management
consultants (see eg Hamel and Prahalad, 1994).  It commonly co-exists
with the conviction that they have found the unique recipe for
rectifying the failure of firms or countries (a trait particularly well-
developed in the Anglo-Saxon world of one-time leaders that have
allegedly failed).  I believe that some of the insights this process has
generated have been valuable: it has, for example, helped us to
understand the role of corporate learning and organisational
capabilities in generating asymmetries between firms that provide a key
to understanding competitive performance.  Like Monsieur Jourdain
and his prose, “new” industrial economists and business historians are
now beginning to formulate explicitly what thoughtful businessmen
have long implicitly understood about the limits of the simpler,
3neoclassical models of “old” industrial economists.  The following
comments are not intended to undermine that endeavour, but to
reinforce it by disciplining some of its more adventurous
generalisations.
2. PROPOSED TEST
The over-use of the survivor technique, distorting our understanding of
the process that has led to the present state of things, has affected
several disciplines besides business history.  If we merely observe that
many of the firms that now dominate the economy are of ancient
lineage1, or that some of today’s top firms were also at the top a
century earlier, we might conclude that giant firms are generally long
lasting; yet the stated observation is equally compatible with the
hypothesis that some initially small firms grow rapidly to become large,
while corporate giants have, over reasonably long periods, a poor
survival rate.  Our current knowledge of survivors dominates our
impression of the typical experience and their triumphs are lionised;
while the history of the failures is forgotten or considered untypical.
The first step in rectifying resulting misinterpretations has usually
been to examine a population of firms defined ex ante.  For this essay
I have extended Schmitz’s (1993) work, to generalise about the global
industrial giants of 1912.  While there are no doubt still some
omissions, I believe the amended list in Appendix A below includes
almost all the industrial (mining and manufacturing2) firms in the world
with an equity market capitalisation3 of $26m or more in 1912.  These
were large firms even by today’s standards: the largest (US Steel)
employed 221,025 workers in 1912; other firms on the list typically
employed more than 10,000.4   They were also, generally, firms that
had already stood the test of time, being on average 32 years “old” in
the corporate sense, and often much longer established as partnerships
or earlier private firms.  They were not the outcome of temporary stock
market bubbles: these were the survivors of a brutal shake-out process
4after the global turn-of-the-century stock market booms and merger
waves, in which many giants with watered stock but few capabilities
had drastically declined (Livermore, 1935; Lamoreaux, 1984; Hannah,
1975; Tilly, 1982; Samber 1997).  They were, on the whole, firms that
contemporary stock market analysts considered attractive and safe
because of their consistently reliable record of generous but sustainable
dividends (Meyer 1910, p.196).  A population of 1900 giant firms
would almost certainly  show earlier exits and faster rates of decline
than this population of maturing “Giant Redwoods”.
In order to assess their propensity to decline or develop, it was
necessary to devise a comparable measure of the size of the 1912 firms
in 1995.  Equity market capitalisation is again available for survivors,
but, the comparison needs to take account of inflation.  The deflator I
have used is US stock market prices, more specifically the Standard &
Poor industrial ‘500’ index.  The rise in US stock prices (measured thus
between 1912 and 1995 and averaging about 6% compound per year)
clearly partly reflects the declining value of the dollar (averaging 4%
per year between 1912 and 1995) but also some real growth.  It seems
appropriate to use a deflator that also captures the fact that even firms
merely sustaining their market position would have participated in this
growth, which in the OECD countries has, over the century as a whole,
attained levels just above 2% per annum per caput, with some extensive
growth in the number of industrial workers also (Maddison 1981,
p.15).
One intuitive interpretation of the 1995 equity market
capitalisation, thus revalued “at 1912 Stock Exchange prices”, is that
it reflects the difference between how the long-run strategy of the 1912
managers actually turned out and what they would have left posterity
if they had instead decided they had no distinctive capabilities, retired
and handed their assets to a hypothetical index-matching fund manager.
If the 1912 and 1995 values were found to be equal, it would imply
they would have lost nothing (except their managerial incomes) if they
had followed that path, while a ratio of 1995 to 1912 “size” below 1
would suggest that giving up in 1912 would have been a better bet.  A
5ratio above 1 would suggest that, in the long-term, the firm’s
capabilities were broadened (eg by extensive growth into wider
geographic or product space) or deepened (by adding new competitive
advantages, perhaps from R&D, or branding).
This appealing intuition should not be pressed too far, however.
A sell-out in 1912 of firms of this size, even where possible, would not
necessarily have been at the market price: break-up values were less
than the going-concern values reflected in the market price;  but
takeover values could be higher.  Equally the ratio of 1995 to 1912 size
should not be taken as a measure of investor returns: that would require
an analysis of the intervening dividends (and other flows to and from
shareholders), which could have seen higher or lower than the
Standard & Poor average.  In principle, investor returns could be better
even if no firm existed at the end: a monopoly well-milked is better for
investors than a residue of unprofitable corporate assets.5  By the same
token, a firm may have been under bankruptcy protection, severely
compromising its equity investors’ assets, but still remain large-scale,
reflecting its other capabilities rather than temporary financial
mismanagement or ill-luck.  A recent example is Texaco, which was
under bankruptcy protection in 1987, but still retains significant
capabilities and, by our measure, is the fifth best performer of the
hundred 1912 giants.  Several German firms have also had parallel
experiences in their frequently disrupted and dismembered national
past.  Our concern is not the outcome for investors, but rather the
survival, development or decline of capabilities embodied in the firm.
In that spirit we are primarily interested in the “size” of the 1995 firm
relative to that of 1912: the 1912 firm’s adjusted 1995 stock market
value reflects in some sense whether the “lump” of corporate
capability, defined by the boundaries of the firm, has grown or
declined.  
Of course that size will have been affected by many factors other
than its assets in 1912 and the skill with which its 1912 managers then
deployed them.6  Market position and scale often conferred first-mover
advantages, but the competitive process was one of continuous
6movement, not just initial position: the capabilities needed (and their
potential usefulness in the marketplace) were naturally transformed
over time.  New corporate resources were also added, not just in ways
indirectly captured in our Stock Exchange price deflator (eg reinvested
profits), but by new capital issues or new stock issued for firms
acquired (and acquisition activity was one to which many of these firms
were strongly prone).  By implication, we assume all of Unilever’s
“organisational capability” came from the British half (Lever Brothers)
not its Dutch half (Margarine Unie), while DuPont’s stock of skills
implicitly came entirely from its chemical rather than oil company
(Conoco) heritage.  Because of stock issued to finance such mergers
and acquisitions or to finance internal expansion, stockholders will
probably have done worse than our measure of changes in the “lump
of managerial capability” suggests.7  In that sense, adopting a ratio of
1 between the 1995 and 1912 values as the threshold defining
corporate capability enhancement (rather than decline) should be
considered a very weak test, biased in favour of diagnosing corporate
growth.  We will be making simple, comparative, long-run judgements
and our choice of deflators and benchmarks is usually biased against
the hypothesis being tested.  
There are two remaining problems of the capability survival test
for our 1912 giant firms: identifying the precise ‘heir’ of the 1912 firm,
and dealing with giant firms that were themselves taken over or
otherwise ‘disappeared’ between 1912 and 1995.  Some arbitrary
judgements are inevitable — the genetic descent of corporations is less
unambiguously defined by economic than by human reproductive
processes — but we have tried to apply standard rules to resolve
difficult cases.  Corporate descent is defined in organisational (rather
than legal or technological or marketing) terms.  The successor firm of
American Tobacco is American Brands, even though it no longer sells
tobacco in America and recently disposed of the subsidiary bearing its
original name in that business.8 Considered strategic decisions to
change business lines are accepted as the corporate destiny: American
Can is now Travelers Group (not part of the Triangle Group that
7bought the can-making subsidiary), Singer is now Bicoastal (not the
Hong Kong-Bermudan sewing machine and computer company that
laboriously re-assembled a world-class sewing machine business, that
Singer’s managers had believed had no future and broken up).9  Where
mergers have been reversed, the intervening life is ignored: Bayer is the
successor of Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (the intervening IG Farben
notwithstanding), Zeneca is the successor of Brunner Mond (the
intervening ICI notwithstanding).  Where voluntary demergers have
occurred, the larger core is taken as the continuing firm. However,
when demerger derived from government action, large resulting entities
are credited as joint successors: Du Pont became Du Pont plus Hercules
and Atlas, Lothringer Hüttenverein became Knutange and Klöckner,
Burmah is now Burmah Castrol plus BP, Western Electric is now
Lucent Technologies plus Northern Telecom.10  Firms may leave
archaeological remains — as in the survival of the Armour and Swift
brand names as a small part of a subsidiary of Conagra  — but both
firms are (reasonably) judged no longer to exist. 
Yet some firms that have ‘disappeared’ into a larger entity retain
substantial, separately identifiable, capabilities in “quasi-firms”, clearly
deriving from the 1912 entity.  The National Biscuit Company is
traceable in 1995, but had ‘disappeared’ into RJR Nabisco; similarly
Imperial Tobacco is now a division of Hanson Industries.  In both cases
the larger entity built on the surviving capability of the acquired
company and sometimes recognised its independent viability.  Indeed,
in these two special cases, both parents were discussing demerger of
their subsidiary, so that it would again become an independent firm.
Clearly such cases on the verge of corporate “reincarnation” are
different from a 1912 firm that had truly “disappeared” in the sense of
being liquidated (eg Central Leather), sold at a  price reflecting long-
run decline (eg Pullman) or acquired from bankruptcy protection by an
optimistic corporation which proved unable to turn it around (eg
AEG).  Valuing surviving subsidiaries or divisions in 1995 as separate
entities is problematic: AEG, for example, if valued on the basis of
capitalising divisional profits, would actually have a negative value
8(which would probably be too pessimistic an assessment of its surviving
capabilities).  We have therefore valued acquired firms at the estimated
price paid for acquiring their equity11 at the time of their substantive
disappearance12, converting this to “1912 Stock Exchange prices” by
the appropriate Standard & Poor 500 index point, as with 1995
survivors.  Acquisition prices are usually at a substantial premium to
market values and, if acquired firms were generally declining13, the
earlier date of the acquisition would impart an upward bias, relative to
surviving firms valued in 1995.  This measure is, therefore, presented
separately in our tables.  Recognising its upward bias, it will be used
when a full sample of outcomes is required or where it is clear that it
is biased against the hypothesis being tested.
A final problem is nationalisation.  This was, for reasons not
unconnected with their size14, a serious risk for the giant firms of 1912.
All the Russian, Mexican and French firms in the 1912 list, many of
the German ones, and parts of some British15 ones were at some stage
nationalised and some remain in state hands.  Nationalised firms like
BP and St Gobain continued to be managed like private firms and by
1995 were privatised, so can be treated in the normal way.  Giant
Russian companies (of which there were three in 1912) pose
difficulties.  Nobel Brothers (the only Asian firm in the 1912 list, with
St Petersburg headquarters but mainly Azerbaijani operations) was
expropriated after the Russian Revolution; the company’s rump of
Western operations (eg in Poland) was worth little when finally
liquidated in the 1950s.  Two other Russian firms in industries with no
large quoted 1995 successors (one iron and steel firm, the other in
railroad engineering) are also pessimistically treated as declining to
zero value.  However, where Western firms remain nationalised, we
have taken the 1995 balance sheet assets less any traceable dedicated
debts as a proxy for market value.
3. DID GIANT FIRMS GROW OR DECLINE (1912-1995)?
9Four-fifths of the giant companies in the 1912 list were based in the
major industrial countries of their day: Germany, Britain, and, above
all, America, which alone accounted for over half.  They had amassed
substantial assets — physical, human and/or reputational — to become
the largest corporations globally.  Most had distinctive accumulations
of skills, architectures of internal or external relationships, first mover
advantages, economies of scale, scope or experience, or technological
leads, of a kind that asymmetrically endowed them with competitive
advantages over other firms.  That these were in many cases the
outcome of a path-dependent (and difficult to replicate) process of
organisational learning is also clear.  The parables of learning that we
have told16 are prominently represented among the 1912 giants and
they could be replicated many times over.  They include Westinghouse
Air Brake, whose market power over its railroad customers — then the
dominant transportation providers — derived from network standard
setting in which exclusive private ownership (at least in the days before
Microsoft) was not common.  Some — including Shell, Jersey Standard
(Exxon) and Rio Tinto (RTZ) — derived market power from control of
raw material resources or distribution networks, or — like Eastman
Kodak or Siemens — from popularising new technologies.  Others —
like Guinness, Procter & Gamble and Lever Brothers — had pioneered
branded products in mass urban markets.
The business history literature understandably focuses on
companies such as these which, because they have been sustained
successes, remain familiar to us today.  There is, however, a danger in
this perspective of developing a somewhat Panglossian view of giant
corporations as repositories of capabilities which are self-sustaining.
Indeed, their long-run success easily reinforces the stronger view that
such corporations  were able to entrench their existing market position
and also developed organisational routines which reinforced what they
had already learned, creating dynamic, learning organisations which
would, through geographical (often multinational) expansion, through
diversification into new product markets, or through the
institutionalisation of innovation by R&D, constantly expand the ambit
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of their capabilities.  That some firms — Procter & Gamble, Du Pont,
Shell, Siemens and others — did so is undoubtedly true, but how
typical were they?  That question is rarely answered in relation to a
population defined at the start of the process, rather than by the
remembered survivors.
Yet who now remembers German giants of 1912 like Hohenlohe
Iron & Steel, British ones like Metropolitan Carriage or US ones like
Central Leather, the Nevada Consolidated and Utah Copper group or
Cudahy Packing?  And when firms that have drastically declined, like
US Steel (now USX Marathon), are remembered, it is usually as
exemplars of their failure to expand their capabilities, as elephants that
did not learn to dance in a world in which corporations (if they are
wise or well-advised) normally do.
Our 1912 population — and our tracking of the outcomes by
1995  — enable us to judge how typical the firms we remember are,
relative to those we have largely forgotten.  Is it easy to expand
corporate capability (whether at the terminal date of 1995 or by earlier
exit at a respectable size) or are cumulative corporate learning and
capability expansion difficult tricks for giant firms to pull off?  Table
2 indicates that just over a quarter of the firms did both remain
independent and experience growth and just over a fifth managed to
stay in the top 100 by market capitalisation in 1995.  Yet such
favourable outcomes were less common for giants than either corporate
disappearance or experience of bankruptcy or a close shave with it.17
Nearly three-quarters of the 100 giant firms had disappeared or were
smaller in 1995 than in 1912.  The average giant firm, it is true, was
larger in size in 1995 (or on its earlier disappearance) than it had been
in 1912, but this average was heavily influenced by the few cases of
exceptionally strong growth18, less than a third of companies showed
positive growth, and the modal ratio was zero. Overall, in this highly
skewed distribution, the ratio of terminal to 1912 values was,
depending on the assumptions made, between 1.1 and 1.4 when
something around 3 was required to stay in the global top 100
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industrial firms.19  The dominant tendency to experience decline was
particularly marked among the larger of the 1912 giants.20
To extend Marshall’s analogy of the population of firms as the
“trees of the forest”, the Giant Redwoods among them were in the
long-run prone to death and decline, and the super giants more than
most. Economists are notoriously shy about defining what they mean
by the long-run, but it is certainly a shorter time in economics than in
silviculture: we are talking about corporate “redwoods” with a distinct
propensity to die over decades, not the centuries of their natural
cousins.  The “quarter-life” of the 1912 giants (ie the time taken for a
quarter of them to disappear in bankruptcy, nationalisation or merger)
was thirty-three years, and they are, as we approach the millennium,
now hovering around their half-life.21  The time elapsed since 1912 —
eight decades or so — is not much longer than the business “half-life”
of a single human being22, though, of course, personally-managed
businesses generally had much shorter average life spans than this.
Small firms certainly have shorter average lives than giant firms23 — it
usually takes longer to walk down a mountain than to roll off a hillock
— but both large and small firms commonly die.  They differ only in
the length of time they take and, even in that respect, by surprisingly
little: to raise a joint stock company’s half-life by one year, it is
necessary to increase its size by twenty-three times.24  The proposition
that it would be possible to fritter away $3b (much less $90b) in a
human lifetime is one I personally find daunting, but business leaders
are evidently made of sterner stuff.  Three billion dollars is the value
(in 1995 stock exchange prices) that the market placed on the smallest
of these firms’ “lump of capabilities” in 1912 (and $90b that of the
largest); yet overall these firms barely increased their value, many had
decimated it or dissipated it completely.  The supposedly exceptional
turbulence in corporate rankings (now modishly  asserted by
businessmen to have followed the liberalisation of world trade, oil
crises and the spread of industrialisation) is in fact also observed in the
earlier periods of increasing national autarchy and relative economic
stagnation. Corporate dinosaurs are ubiquitous in an ever-changing
12
world. As the old English music hall joke had it: Q.  How do I build a
successful small firm?  A.  Easily!  Buy a large one and wait!
One interpretation of the strong tendency to stagnation or decline
would be that it was the rational strategy of dominant firms pursuing
shareholder profit-maximisation, a point argued for US Steel’s early
decline by Stigler (1965).  Rather than set an entry-preventing price, it
may be sensible for dominant firms to milk their monopoly position
while yielding market share to competitors. This was particularly likely
where it helped firms appear respectable to anti-trust authorities,
especially when rivals thus indulged respected price levels.  Casual
inspection of the business histories of the declining firms in this
population suggests that planned decline was rarely their explicit
objective, though it may have been implicit in their muddled reactions.
We have not investigated overall stockholder returns, but the general
impression in these companies’ histories is of depressed profits
desperately used by managements to paper over the cracks of declining
capabilities, not of generosity to stockholders during a pre-planned
yielding to competitors of market share they could not have expected
to keep.  Stigler’s hypothesis could clearly be investigated further, but
it appears unlikely to account for more than a small proportion of the
1912 giants’ propensity to reduce their size.25
The implications of these observations for industrial economists
are clear.  While we naturally focus on success — on corporations that
did learn to expand or sustain their capabilities — this is not something
that giant managerial hierarchies have normally been very good at. In
fact the alleged twentieth century tendency to increased industrial
concentration is by no means universal or sustained in all national
markets (Hannah, 1995) and probably is quite mild on a global basis
also.  
The implications for the parables that business historians tell and
for understanding individual corporate evolution are that we should be
as sensitive to the sources of eroding capabilities as of their building.
Corporations can forget as well as learn; their inherited learning can
become redundant (or even dysfunctional) in a changed environment;
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“first mover” advantages appear fleeting; supposedly distinctive
capabilities can be replicated or improved upon by competitor firms.26
Such outcomes appear to be twice as common as successful expansion
of capabilities for giant corporations.
Clearly if we could distinguish ex ante what determines how firms
can beat the normal form and do well, we could change the balance of
economic evolution and (presumably) become very rich men.  The
reader will not, then, be surprised that it is in fact very difficult to do
so, and that those who have so far been brave enough to attempt it are
quite unconvincing.  While this population of firms is not large enough
— given the variability of outcomes — to generate many statistically
significant results27, it does enable us at least to call in question some
generic recipes for corporate success, even those generated with
hindsight.  If ex post “prediction” is difficult, we can be reasonably
certain that ex ante prediction will pose a few problems; the strategic
management consultants we should most respect are the modest ones.
4. NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE
Perhaps the most widely believed systematic model of corporate failure
is Chandler’s recent international comparison, invoking Britain’s
failure to develop professionally managed, large, corporate hierarchies
as a reason for Britain’s twentieth century economic decline, relative
to Germany and the USA (Chandler, 1990). This thesis is appealingly
grounded in a compelling argument about corporate capability, but its
vigorously stated comparative perspectives are vulnerable from a
number of angles (Alford, 1994; Hannah, 1995).  Our population of
“Giant Redwoods” certainly provides no support for the hypothesis
that large British firms were less likely to sustain their capabilities than
German and American ones.  Indeed, as Table 2 suggests, the reverse
is true: British firms were more likely to survive, more likely to remain
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in the top 100 and averaged a higher degree of capability expansion
than American or German ones.28 
These results invite speculation rather on British advantages as a
home for corporate Giant Redwoods29, particularly when viewed in
relation to the markedly inferior growth performance of the UK
economy for many decades after 1912. The British giant corporations
perhaps had more staying power because in 1912 they were domiciled
in a free trade country, while American corporations were substantially
over-protected by high tariffs and German ones moderately so (Capie
1994, p.59): British 1912 capabilities were thus already disciplined by
more stringent (because more global) market tests.  British giant
corporations also tended already to spread an unusually high
proportion of their corporate resources globally. Since perhaps a third
of the British giant corporations’ activities were located overseas in
1912, probably twice as much as the average American or German
giant corporation at that time (Hannah, 1996), they were less
constrained by their home market performance and already more fitted
to compete globally.
However, it would be a mistake to pursue such speculations very
far.  Our results are sufficient to cast doubt on the notion that there
were exceptionally few large British corporations or that they were
especially notable for failing to sustain or develop their capabilities, but
they are vulnerable to highly variable individual outcomes on small
numbers of cases.  They add to the suspicion that Chandler started a
wild goose chase in Scale and Scope, and his conclusions on national
differences are unlikely to be rescued by wider samples including more,
moderately large, industrial firms.30  Broadberry (forthcoming) has, in
any case, shown that America and Germany overtook Britain in the
twentieth century not by maximising their relative labour productivity
performance in manufacturing, but rather by shifting resources out of
agriculture (an option not open to already heavily industrialised
Britain) and by overtaking the exceptionally strong British labour
productivity performance in services.  (For one example of US
performance see Raff and Temin (forthcoming); for a general discussion
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see Wright (forthcoming).)  Broadberry’s sectoral disaggregation of
productivity change thus further undermines the view that national
differentiation in the performance of manufacturing corporations
fundamentally drove twentieth century changes in national competitive
advantage.  More generally, Robert Reich has exposed some flaws in
the view that the national corporate champions and the economies of
nation states are closely coupled (Reich, 1992; but cf Lazonick, 1996).
Nor can the possibility be ruled out that vigorous competition of
smaller firms displacing giants, not sustaining the first-mover giants
themselves, is the primary sign of a vigorous economy and that this
differentiates Germany and America from Britain more than their large
corporations.
If business historians devote more attention to national differences
in large corporates’ performance, they should formulate some clearer
hypotheses that fit the facts better.  Until then it would be best to
assume that nationality is not a significant variable in the performance
of large corporations at least among industrial leaders. Some of the
methods of successful large corporations and nations31, and — it seems
reasonable now to add — some of the mistakes of unsuccessful ones,
appear to be equally easily replicated or spread.
As Table 3 suggests, more countries host the giant industrial firms
of today than in 1912, though the newcomers have mainly entered at
the expense of the USA and of Germany not of Britain.32   We
evidently have to look elsewhere than giant corporate performance to
differentiate successful from unsuccessful nations. We will return later
to the question of more plausible candidates in the analysis of national
economic differentiation.33
5. ARE THERE “SUNSET” AND “SUNRISE” INDUSTRIES
OR “SUNSET” AND “SUNRISE” FIRMS?
The various industries in which the giant firms of 1912 were
concentrated appear at first sight to have exhibited more consistent
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patterns of performance than their nationality.34  As Table 4 shows,
about half the firms are in five industries — coal mining, textiles and
leather, non-ferrous metals and other mining, iron and steel (and
related heavy industries) and mechanical engineering — in which the
average firm had substantially declined in size at the terminal date,
very few giant firms increased in size and only one (RTZ) remained in
the 1995 top 100.  The “successes” in these “old”35 industries often
achieved it by selling out early (eg the railroad equipment
manufacturer, Metropolitan Carriage, in 1919 with a ratio of 2.0);
others succeeded in their core old activities as well as new ones (eg
Mannesmann, with the best ratio for this group of industries of 2.7 in
1995).  A few well-performing survivors shifted industry completely:
eg American Can into financial services (with a ratio of 1.9) or the
French steel giant Schneider into electrical engineering (achieving the
stability ratio of 1.0).  Such “new” industries undoubtedly offered
better growth opportunities but, of course, many of the “old” 1912
industries did not have any relevant capabilities to transfer to them in
order to escape constraints in individual markets.  Judging from giant
firms in coal, textiles and railroad equipment manufacture, the speed
or degree of the collapse of their markets and/or the limitations on
inter-industry  transfer of their capabilities of 1912 posed particularly
tough obstacles. The most promising solution for such firms may have
been the absorption into other firms that many of them suffered,
presumably to maximise the value of what few transferable skills they
still embodied.36  By the same token, firms that were in 1912 already
in the rapidly-growing industries of petroleum, chemicals and electrical
engineering (industries whose giant firms more than doubled in real size
on average) perhaps had a somewhat easier task in converting their
initial stock of skills and building dynamic capabilities.  Branded
products firms — the most numerous of the “new” industries in the
1912 list — were also more likely to grow than to decline.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that giant firms had
clearly pre-destined outcomes depending on their initial “sunrise” or
“sunset” industry base.  In fact, there was more diversity of
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performance within industries than between them.37  Even in an
industry as promising as electrical manufacturing — where three out of
five firms scored above 1 — Westinghouse (0.7) and AEG (0.3)
performed weakly.  Oil companies overall did well, but relative
laggards, when nationalised or taken over, could be below their 1912
size. The branded product firms include some of the great twentieth
century successes like Procter & Gamble (8.2) or Lever Brothers
(Unilever) (3.4) but also some of the more remarkable failures like
American Tobacco/Brands (0.4) or Cudahy Packing (0.1).  In industries
where decline was the typical outcome — like the steel and related
engineering industries — not all had to go the way of US Steel (0.1),
International Harvester (0.1) or Krupp (0.2); Gewerkschaft deutscher
Kaiser (Thyssen) (0.9) and John Deere & Co (0.9) did distinctly better.
As the last column of Table 4 shows, both old and new industries
showed considerable variability of growth outcomes: the coefficient of
variation exceeded 60 in all industries and exceeded 100 in half of
them. This pattern of diversity of experience within industries is
consistent with the pattern revealed by wider samples of firms over
shorter periods (eg Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991).  Dynamic
economies — of which the global economy in which most of these
firms in varying degrees operated is the largest case — indeed consist
of rising and declining industries, but businesses can develop and
sustain competitive advantages in either kind of industry.  Simplistic
recipes for industry portfolio management may have earned consultants
fortunes, but a surer key to sustained success is learning to operate
distinctively and profitably anywhere, rather than paying expensively
for fashionable diversifying acquisitions in industries in which no
distinctive new proprietor value can be added (Kay, 1995).
How, then, can large corporations retain their positions, continue
to add value and expand their capabilities?  The only reasonable
answer is: with great difficulty.  Samuel Johnson’s view, that “business
could not be managed by those who manage it if it had much
difficulty”, has often appealed to academic analysts and is probably
true of the generality of businesses; but the generality of businesses —
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in the short- or long-term depending on their initial size — are dead.
It is a pleasant conceit of us all — from business school professors,
through academic analysts to management consultants — that the
world would be a better place if systematic analysis could change that.
Given the high incidence and costs of corporate decline and failure —
and the distance of the spectre of global domination by a few
exceptionally competent firms — it is doubtless in the social (as well
as the private) interest that all possible steps should be taken to
encourage such systematic analysis.  To date, however, we have made
great strides in storytelling, but a clearer, surer recipe for sustained38
success for large corporations has remained elusive.
This outcome is not accidental: it is inherent in the competitive
market process that underpins the success of twentieth century
capitalism.  Most of the companies we have described were remarkable
successes in 1912; their high stock market valuation reflected their
ability to earn super-normal profits.  These profits were often a reward
for large-scale investments in production, management and marketing,
along the lines described by Chandler (1990).  There was often
something more — a technological advantage, exclusive possession of
raw materials or of valuable distribution networks, a strong brand
image — to entrench the position of the first movers in the Chandlerian
sense.  Yet, as Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) have emphasised,
such advantages are often fleeting and contingent.  Patents were of
limited effectiveness, advertising built up rival brands, new mines and
oil wells were discovered, techniques of management, production and
marketing were copied.  Even where this could not easily happen,
exogenous changes in the technology of production or in the nature of
markets could make the initial advantage insecure; entrenched positions
could also be challenged by anti-trust or by expropriations (both
nationalisations and those following defeat in war).
Where such challenges were ineffective, or where they were
neutralised by the firms’ own strategic initiatives, the giants survived,
but, given the power of competitive forces, it is arguably no surprise
that disappearance or decline was nearly three times more likely among
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the giants than growth.  The process of copying was one that often
competed the profits of the onetime leaders down to normal levels,
spreading the benefits of their initial advantage more widely.  Firms that
limited this process and maintained some competitive advantage once
could, in principle, have had a run of further luck that enabled them
constantly  to entrench new capabilities.  A more plausible explanation
of survivors is that they had some distinctive architecture which
enabled them — but not others — constantly to replicate their early
success (Kay, 1993).  Such corporate architectures must be complex
and difficult to identify, describe and copy, for, if that were not the
case, their value would be competed down by emulators.  By
definition, we do not know what those architectures are, though it is
plausible that their corporate operators have acquired that knowledge
through a process of collective, tacit learning, transmissable between
managerial generations.
This points up starkly the catch-22 of their craft for all business
historians and management gurus.  They naturally view that bleak
scientific point sceptically, as the fund manager views the financial
economist’s “efficient markets hypothesis”, with which it has close
affinities.39  It is perfectly possible, in both cases, to discover a
generically effective strategy, but, when we do, its profitability will be
competed down by the emulation our discovery prompts.  The gold we
have unearthed will very soon turn into the dross of normal profits, as
its benefits are widely spread, but the private dross represents the broad
social benefit of expanding average capabilities.
Both the incentive to develop competitive advantages, and the
incentive to emulate them, were strong in the societies in which the
giant firms of 1912 operated.40  Large firms themselves became very
efficient surveyors of the possibilities, increasingly competing with and
emulating each other.  In that sense, the averagely weak ability of large
firms to develop the distinctive capabilities that had once generated
their size is a sign, not of their individual weaknesses, but of their
collective strengths within the capitalist market system.  Marx
understood the ‘contradictions’ in this dialectical system well.
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Paradoxically, capitalist firms are induced by the search for surplus
value (supernormal profits) to grow; but competition between them
also tends to destroy the distinctive sources of supernormal profits.
Marx’s mistake was to consider this a weakness in the stage of
economic evolution he then saw unfolding. In fact, the mix of
incentives and checks it created has been capitalism’s fundamental
strength as the (now globally favoured) system of social organisation.
6. WHICH NATIONAL DIFFERENCES WERE MOST
SUSTAINABLE?
If that view of the world is accepted, we might expect international
differences among giant firms to diminish in all except a few cases of
well-entrenched or undiscoverable competitive advantages.  We can see
some of this process in the chemical industry, which accounted for ten
of the world’s largest 100 industrial firms in 1912 and for twenty in the
1995 top 100.  In 1912 the chemical giants of Britain, Germany and
America were substantially differentiated.  The Germans — with
excellent universities and moderately-paid scientists — were strongest
in the research-intensive sector, where these cheap human resources
were a particular advantage, that is in fine chemicals (then mainly
dyestuffs).  The British, with plentiful and cheap supplies of capital,
excelled in the capital-intensive sector.  The major technological
innovation in this sector, the Solvay process, had been licensed by its
Belgian owners to separate British, US and German companies: of
these, only the British firm, Brunner Mond, was large enough to enter
the top 100 (the other licensees, Deutsche Solvay and the US-based
Solvay Process Company, though operating in bigger national markets,
were less profitable).  The largest US chemical firm was Du Pont, an
explosives specialist, with its national market among mines and gun-
owners larger than European equivalents (the London-based Nobel
Dynamite Trust had a near-monopoly in both the British and German
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explosives markets, but was still just too small to qualify for entry to
the 1912 list).
However, these superficially strong national differences among
giant chemical corporations were short-lived.  Du Pont had already in
1912 begun to focus its research and development strategy, so that it
was poised to become an engine of growth and diversification for the
company nach deutscher Art (Hounshell and Smith, 1988).  In the
next quarter century, the somewhat diverse chemical giants of Britain,
Germany and America all became very much more like each other: as
research-intensive as the Germans, as capital-intensive as the British
and as market-orientated as the Americans. This occurred partly by
expropriation (notably by the British and Americans of German patents
and other assets) but also by processes of competition and emulation
of advantages seen in domestic and overseas competitors.  Chemical
engineering and financing techniques, research laboratories, patent
pools and multinational investment all played their part in the process.
The competitive advantages that had once seemed nationally distinctive
rarely remained so.  Indeed, with the widespread post-World War II
entry of the oil companies into downstream chemical operations, it
became obvious that not only rival chemical companies but also
vertically-related producers could copy and acquire the chemical
companies’ various research, production and marketing skills.  The
process was not all one-way, for there were still some good reasons for
pursuing distinctive strategies in a changing and complex world41, but,
except in the pharmaceutical sector (where, patent protection is
unusually effective), it was difficult for companies to entrench any
distinctiveness (and the supernormal profits that brought) for long.
The process of competitive emulation of distinctive advantages
nationally and internationally can be traced more precisely for what
has been seen by many business historians as the distinctive generic
capability facilitating the management of the giant diversified
corporations that allegedly prospered in the twentieth century world.
Chandler (1962) showed the postwar spread of the multi-divisional
organisation through US industry, after its pioneering in the 1920s by
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firms like General Motors.42  Table 5 shows that its postwar spread
throughout the five other major industrial countries was less rapid, but,
with only a slight lag, the M-form was widely adopted in Britain, and,
soon after, in Germany, France, Japan and even in Italy, which was
notorious for having relatively few giant US-style corporations.
Yet, in many respects, these countries’ business cultures are
undoubtedly profoundly different; the spread of the M-form simply
demonstrates that these national differences are minimised by large-
scale business institutions.  Techniques of managing large corporations,
of harnessing central research laboratories to diversification, or of
advertising national brands may easily be copied by the large
corporations of one nation from another, or a multinational may enter
the market to spread them.  Competition and emulation thus do a great
deal to homogenise the giant firm sector in reasonably competent
advanced industrial countries.43  In that sense, we should not be
surprised at our earlier conclusion that some popular characterisations
of national differences in large corporations appeared to be caricatures,
even if (like all good caricatures) they sharply focus on one distorted
aspect of the truth. 
Where, then, is national differentiation in business cultures and
business institutions likely to reside, if it is not in industrial giants?
There are, I suggest, two main locations.  First, the culturally-
embedded characteristics of business are often reinforced by local
institutions underpinning small and medium-sized businesses: such
essentially localised businesses are inherently less subject to (though,
of course, not entirely immune from) many of the pressures for
international emulation and homogenisation.  Well-known examples
in the literature are the German apprenticeship training system (which
underpins the powerful world market position of German Mittelstand
firms in the engineering industry) and Italian small firm networks
(typified by Porter’s (1990) well-known example of Sassuolo’s ceramic
tiles).  Firms may find it difficult to capture the resulting rents — so
they do not generally appear in lists of large firms like ours  — but the
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positive impact on national living standards (and the sustainability of
the differences underpinning that) are likely to be considerable.
The second likely area of substantial and sustained national
differentiation is in the utilities and communications sectors.  Public
ownership or state regulation of competitive processes dominate here
and frequently prevent international convergence of institutions and
standards.  It seems quite likely, for example, that the USA’s ability to
increase its lead over Britain in living standards in the first half of the
twentieth century was more due to its relative performance in these
services (in which Britain had an initial lead which was reversed) than
in manufacturing (in which the British productivity gap remained
remarkably stable) (Hannah, 1995; Broadberry, 1998).
Research on contrasts in national economic performance and their
relationship to business institutions is difficult and not yet
systematically developed.  There may be some mileage in further
international comparisons of giant industrial corporations, but, if our
findings are a pointer, business historians may more productively focus
their research on national institutional differences in other directions.
The prize of focussing our efforts accurately is an attractive one: the
understanding of the microeconomic foundations of the
macroeconomic convergence processes that economists have identified
in the modern economic development of advanced industrial nations,
and also of the limits on such convergence processes.
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1. Harris Corporation (1996) shows that 39% of the Fortune US top
500 are more than 100 years old and a further 50% were founded
between the 1880s and 1920s.  The oldest American firm in the 1912
list, Lorillard & Co, can be traced back to 1760.  European firms are,
of course, generally older: some (relatively small) modern firms had
mediaeval origins and the large French firm St Gobain can plausibly be
traced back to the mid-seventeenth century, though it did not take
modern corporate form until the nineteenth century.
2. The study is confined to these sectors because they most clearly
approximate to being globally competitive in the twentieth century and
we wish to test how corporate evolution in such markets works.
3. A few giant companies (mainly American and German and often
family-owned) had no quoted equity capital in 1912; we have taken
total balance sheet assets, net of any bonded debt, or similar proxies for
equity market capitalisation in such cases, noted by a * in Appendix A.
We have also treated Western Electric (which had recently become a
subsidiary of AT&T) in this way.  All nationalised or substantially
state-owned firms of 1912 have been excluded. 
4. These employment figures are provided only for illustrative
purposes.  Because the population is defined by a capital measure
(equity market capitalisation), some firms in capital-intensive industries
will be included but employ under 10,000.  Employment data is more
readily available for British and German firms than for other countries:
see eg Shaw (1983), Kocka and Siegrist (1979).
5. see p.14.
6. For that reason, I would expect correlations between 1912 size
and 1995 outcomes to be very low; but since much has been made in
the literature of first mover advantages, dynamic increasing returns and
the sustainability of core corporate capabilities, it is worth defining the
ENDNOTES
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extent of the phenomenon more precisely.
7. eg four of these firms appear on a list of the top ten firms that
destroyed shareholder value by over-investing in the 1980s (Jensen
1993).
8. Such decisions can notably affect the results: the American
Tobacco subsidiary was sold in 1994 for $1b, whereas at our 1995
benchmark the rest of American Brands was worth $8b. 
9. While in individual cases this affects the calculated outcome,
overall the swings may well cancel out the roundabouts: the alternative
option would show American Can performing much worse and Singer
performing rather better.
10. However, most problems of this kind have been avoided by our
choice of dates: 1912 is after the major 1911 divestitures imposed on
Standard Oil and American Tobacco and before the major German
mergers (Vereinigte Stahlwerke and IG Farben) which were later
reversed by allied anti-trust action.  
11. Where this was not published in the press at the time, we have
estimated it from market price data at the time surrounding the merger.
12. Some judgements verge on the arbitrary eg where firms were
temporarily absorbed into a larger firm, then de-merged, then later
merged more completely, we have generally taken their later
disappearance, to preserve some symmetry with our treatment of
surviving (but once merged) firms.
13. As our data imply.  The average terminal ratio of surviving firms
was three times that of acquired ones; and firms acquired prior to 1950
had twice the ratio of firms acquired after 1950, see Table 1 and
Appendix A below.
14. On the Caligulan principle (“I wish the Roman people had but a
single neck”) governments were more likely to nationalise large firms
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than small.
15. BP was majority owned by the state for most of its twentieth
century existence, but not in 1912 or 1995; parts of several other 1912
companies were nationalised in Britain but they were left with a range
of capabilities which have been considered the surviving firms.  In some
cases (eg Vickers) the effects of nationalisation of large parts exaggerate
their measured decline.
16. eg Usselman (1997) for Westinghouse Air Brake, Samber (1997)
for Pittsburgh firms, Genovese & Mullen (1997) for American Sugar,
Lamoreaux & Sokoloff (1977) for Pullman.
17. including nationalisations, which in the longer-run shielded some
of these firms from bankruptcy.
18. Only four cases (Burmah/BP 9.1, Procter & Gamble 8.1, DuPont
7.2 and Arco 5.9) account for about a quarter of the average ratios for
the whole population shown in Table 1 ( their sum divided by 100 is
0.3).
19. To outrank the 100th ranked firm in the 1995 giant industrials,
the lowest-ranked firm of 1912 would have had to achieve a ratio of
4.0.  Of course, much less was required of the very largest 1912 firms:
indeed the largest, US Steel, needed to decline to a tenth of its 1912
size to drop out of the 1995 top 100.  If it had maintained the same real
size, it would have been worth $90.5b in 1995, only a little short of
Royal-Dutch Shell, the actual 1995 leader (at $107.6b), though USX’s
actual 1995 size (even after merging with a 1912 giant oil company
already twice its own size in 1982) was $8.7b and USX did drop out
of the top 100. The average giant firm of 1912 would have had to grow
to 2.7 its 1912 size to achieve the average size of the 1995 top 100,
from $81m to $218m in 1912 stock exchange prices.   
20. As is suggested by the gap between the unweighted average ratios
(1.4) and the (lower) average ratios weighted by 1912 size (1.2), shown
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in Table 1.
21. 52 of the 1912 top hundred firms still formally exist
independently, though arguably some — eg Singer (Biocoastal) and
United States Rubber (Uniroyal) — are so small that they are as good
as disappeared.  The problem of reincarnation also complicates the
calculation: paradoxically rather more 1912 giant firms still existed in
1950 than earlier, in 1945 (largely because of the break-up of I G
Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, which in the 1920s had absorbed
half the German giants of 1912); similarly at least two firms (Nabisco
and Imperial Tobacco) are about to be de-merged from their recently
acquired parents at the time of writing. Because of such reincarnations,
it is wrong to conclude from the longer interval between the quarter life
(1912-45) and the half life (-1999?) that the rate of disappearance
declines over time, though, in the limit, that will become true.
Moreover, if economic evolution is Lamarckian rather than Darwinian
(and the process of corporate learning clearly implies that), we might
expect organisational death rates to decline with age, see eg, Hannan
and Freeman (1984). In calculating half-lives of giant firms we have
assumed they were born giants in 1912, rather than when founded as
small firms.
22. Demographers do not conventionally use the concept of “half-
life” to describe life expectancy, but in advanced industrial economies
the half-life of an 18-year old male would be about fifty years, see
Registrar General (1914), Table III.
23. Most studies of new, small firms show a half-life in very low
single digits.  At the time Marshall began writing, English joint stock
companies had a half-life of about seven years (Shannon, 1933). 
24. In the range between the average English joint stock company and
the average global 1912 giant firm.  Around 1885, joint-stock
companies, whose half-lives are referred to in the previous endnote,
averaged paid-up capital of about £60,000 (Jeffreys 1938, p.130),
compared with equity market values averaging £16.6m in the 1912
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global top 100, a ratio of about 1:275.  Their half-lives were in the ratio
1:12.
25. Even in Stigler’s (1965) study of US Steel, the returns to its
stockholders peaked in real terms 10 years after the merger,  in 1911,
and US Steel stockholders did worse on average than other steel
companies for the remainder of his analysis (1912-25), which cover the
period of this study.  The impression of US Steel post-1925 is also not
very favourable to an extension forward in time of the Stigler
hypothesis.
26. See eg Raff and Temin (1997), Hounshell (1997) and, more
generally, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), Henderson and Clark
(1990).
27. Why not, then, increase the size of the sample?  Because this is
not a sample; it is (or is very close to being) the whole population of
giant firms in 1912.  Though inclusion of very large firms in the $15-
$25M range would be possible, that suffers from the same problem as
the econometrics of national growth rates and convergence (do we
really want Iceland to have the same weight as the United States?).
The truth is that, for assessing corporate or national performance, the
world has not generated enough human experience for us to generalise
econometrically.  Disciplined parables are a more realistic scholarly
objective.  For some indication of the likely results of adding firms in
a lower size range to the study, cf n.32, below.
28. The use of the US rather than the British stock exchange index
(which rose by less) as the deflator biases the results against British-
based firms.
29. Given the poorer performance of larger firms within this sample
noted in Table 1, it might be thought that this would affect national
performance; in fact, however, as Table 2 line 2 shows, the average
British giant firm was slightly larger than the average US firm and
substantially larger than German and ‘other’ firms.  Cf n.36, below, on
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the neutrality of industrial composition effects.
30. Teece (1993, p.214) noted that on Chandler’s own data on the
top 200 firms in each country, leading German firms had a low
probability of maintaining their position, though he was inclined to
excuse it as the effect of war at the 1953 benchmark date for Germany.
But Cassis (1997) observes that the poor German performance persists
in longer-run comparisons with the longevity of large British and
French firms.  Chandler’s study (1990 apppendices) of the largest 200
firms in each country shows that in 1919-48 the median British firm’s
enterprise value (equity capitalisation plus value of quoted debt) nearly
quadrupled, whereas in 1917-48 the median US firm only tripled its
balance sheet assets and 1913-53 the median German firm less than
doubled its balance sheet assets.  There are problems in such direct
comparisons.  The collapse of the mark raises questions about German
balance sheet assets at historic cost as a measure of size, while Tobin’s
q (the ratio between the equity values used by Chandler to measure
British firm sizes and the balance sheet assets he uses to measure US
firm sizes) could have varied substantially at the benchmark dates.
Nonetheless it is striking that Chandler’s own quantitative data requires
very substantial correction to generate results consistent with what his
book purports to explain, and that the only quantitative evidence he
explicitly provides for differential national performance is at the
macroeconomic level, the significance of which Broadberry (1998)
seriously challenges.  This is not to deny that, in some manufacturing
industries, the USA forged ahead of Britain and Germany in the 1940s
and after, see eg, Mishina (1997) for the aircraft manufacturing
example. 
31. The evidence implicit in Kim (1995), of the spread of industrial
capabilities regionally within the USA, especially from the 1930s, is
also consistent with this suggestion.
32. The numbers are small and too much should not be read into
them.  These results, for the whole population of 1995 firms, compared
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with those in Table 2 for 1912 survivors, imply that, although its 1912
giant corporations have not performed well, the USA has created quite
a lot of new ones, while Germany has not: the latter’s distinctive
modern industrial strength is correctly identified with the Mittelstand.
33. see Section 6.
34. Though the poor performance of “Germany” and “other” in Table
2, relative to Britain, is partly due to their having more giant firms in
the “old” industries.  Britain had old industries but eg in coal they were
organised on the basis of Marshallian  industrial districts, with external
economies substituting for economies of scale internal to large firms.
However, America’s poor performance cannot be explained by
industrial composition: it had the same proportions of giant firms in
“new” industries as Britain.
35. Of course they were often considered important and significant
industries at the time: railroad manufacturers were then bigger than car
manufacturers; gold, diamond and copper mines were felt to have
excellent prospects, as were high-tech armaments and ship
manufacturers.  They are “old” only in retrospect.
36. US coal firms were absorbed into firms like Du Pont; in Europe
the post-1945 solution was nationalisation (Britain’s National Coal
Board and Charbonnages de France) or publicly-subsidised private
corporations (Ruhrkohle in Germany): a solution that seems more often
to have expensively delayed decline than facilitated diversification or
skill transfer.
37. The coefficient of variation of the average ratios from the nine
industries is 95; thus there is more variation within the majority of the
industry groups (coal, mechanical engineering, non-ferrous metals, etc,
iron and steel, and branded products) than between industry groups
and, within the four less variable groups (textiles, chemicals, electrical
engineering and petroleum), there is still almost as much variability as
there is between industry groups.
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38. Though, as we suggest below, much diagnosis and emulation, of
a kind which erodes rather than sustains profits, has occurred.
39. and, as with stock-picking, it is easier to give business strategy
advice retrospectively than prospectively!
40. Or at least in the US, the UK and Germany.  The “other”
countries — many what we would now call “emerging markets” —
actually show the worst performance in Table 2, perhaps reflecting that
they did not have these social capabilities in such large measure.
41. A recent example is the rise of the British pharmaceutical industry
in the last quarter of a century.  In 1970 the largest British
pharmaceutical company rated only sixteenth in the world; now Glaxo-
Wellcome is the largest in the world and several others are ranked in
the top 20; even a foreign company like the merger of US Upjohn with
Swedish Pharmacia chose to base its new headquarters in London.
This change in the British position in research-based fine chemicals is
probably due to the advantages of London as a commercial financial
centre and the availability of cheaper scientists from good universities
than the USA and Germany now offer (a similar advantage to pre-1914
Germany, though not one that any sensible country would like to base
its competitive advantage on for long, since it implied sustaining low
living standards).
42. Though Hounshell (1997) suggests the problem of applying it to
different corporations, eg Ford.
43. Even here, however, note that the adoption of the M-form
stabilised in continental Europe and Japan at lower levels than in the
“Anglo-Saxon” countries.  One plausible explanation is contrasts in
their capital markets: the monitoring processes of M-form head offices
may, for example, be undertaken by universal banks or other agents in
less fluid capital markets.  Significantly, while in the US and UK a
positive correlation is found between profitability and M-form adoption
(Armour and Teece 1978, Steer and Cable 1978), no such correlations
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appear in Germany and Japan (Cable and Dirrheimer, 1983; Cable and
Yasuki, 1985; and cf Ingham, 1992).
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TABLE 1
Summary Measures of Long-Run Corporate “Performance” of the
100 Largest Firms of 1912 by 1995
Probability
Survival - in top 100 21%
- larger in 1995 than in 1912 28%
- in recognisable independent form in 1995
  of whatever size 52%
Firms that had experienced some form of liquidation,
nationalisation, break-up or corporate bankruptcy 
protection 29%
Capability “expansion ratios”* (1=stability, below 1= decline) Ratio
- average of survivors 2.0
              (1995 value ÷ 1912 value)  
- average of disappearers 0.6
              (exit value ÷ 1912 value) 
- overall unweighted average 1.4
- overall average weighted by 1912 size 1.2
- overall unweighted average counting all 
  disappearances as zero 1.1
- overall weighted average omitting double 
  counting† 1.1
- proportion of the 100 showing positive growth
  (ie terminal value exceeding 1.0) 35%
- modal value  0
- median 0.4
Notes: *  defined as terminal equity capitalisation at 1912 stock exchange
prices ÷ 1912 equity capitalisation.
†  ie counting as zero any firms permanently acquired by a firm also
in the 1912 top 100.
Source: author’s calculations, based on data in Appendix A.
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TABLE 2 
National Corporate Performance Differentials of 1912 Giants
USA Germany Britain Other
No of firms headquartered there in
1912 54 14 15† 17†
Average equity capitalisation in 1912 $90m $59m $95m $56m
Survival chances:-
in top 100 1995 19% 29% 47% 0%
any independent survival 48% 57% 60% 53%
“Capability Enhancement”*
Proportion showing positive
growth (ie ratios above 1.0) 26% 43% 40% 18%
Unweighted average ratio for
all survivors  2.3 1.9 2.7  0.7
Unweighted average ratio for  
all disappearers 0.7 0.1 0.7  0.3
Overall unweighted average










(Memo item) 1995 real GNP÷
                        1912 real GNP 8 9 4 -
Notes: *  defined as terminal equity capitalisation ÷ 1912 equity capitalisation.
†  Counting Royal-Dutch Shell as wholly British.
Source: author’s calculations, from Appendix data.
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TABLE 3 
 Geographical Distribution of the Top 100 Global Industrial Firms
by Equity Market Capitalisation
Headquarters
Country
                1912                   1995
USA                   54                     40
UK                14.5                  12.5
Germany                  14                       7
France                    6                       5
South Africa                    4                       1
Russia                    3                       0
Belgium                    2                       0
Mexico                    1                       0
Luxembourg                    1                       0
Netherlands                  0.5                    2.5
Japan                    0                     21
Switzerland                    0                    4.5
Sweden                    0                    2.5
Australia                    0                       1
Italy                    0                       1
Finland                    0                       1
Korea                    0                       1
Total                100                   100
Sources: 1912: author’s calculations.
1995: calculated from Business Week’s listings of the world’s largest




Industrial Performance Differentials among 1912 Corporations




















  Coefficient of 
      variation
 
Textiles &  
Leather       4 $0.4B 0.2 0.1 0.1    79
Coal Mining    7 $0.4B 0.1 0.2 0.3  185
Mechanical 
Engineering   10 $0.9B 0.2 0.4 0.6 164
Non-Ferrous 
Metals etc   14  $1.2B 0.4 0.4 0.5 116
Iron/Steel/Heavy 
Industrial   18 $1.5B 0.3 0.6 0.7 125
Branded 
Products   18 $1.6B 1.1 1.3 1.9 142
 
Chemicals   10 $0.4B 2.7 2.4 1.9    79  
Electrical
Engineering    5 $0.4B 3.0 2.7 1.9   70
Petroleum  14 $1.2B 3.2 3.7 2.3   62
 ___ _____ ___ ___ ___  ___
All 1912 
giant firms   100 $8.1B 1.1† 1.4 1.9 140
                                                                                                                                                                
            
* The “overall” industry performance is the average capability enhancement ratio of all firms in
the industry weighted by  their 1912 size; “average” industry performance is unweighted mean
performance; if the former exceeds the latter, truly giant firms perform better than merely very
large firms.
† See Table 1 for omission of double counting.
Source: Author’s calculations from data in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 5  
Adoption of The Multidivisional Structure
(% of the top approximately 100 corporations with M-Form structure)
1913 1932 1950 1960 1970 1980
USA 0 8 17 43 71 81
Japan 1 0 8 29 55 58
Germany 1 - 5 15 50 58
France 1 3 6 21 54 58
Italy - - 7 17 48 -
UK 0 5 13 30 72 80
    Source: See Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A
The World’s 100 Largest Capitalist Industrial Enterprises of 1912
All industrial enterprises1 with equity market capitalisation of $26m
or more in 1912 are listed in rank order within industry groups. For a fuller
account of the construction of this population see Hannah (1997) and
Schmitz (1993).  I am grateful to Alison Sharp for research assistance and
to many national specialists for advice which is more fully acknowledged in
Hannah (1997).  For industry averages see Table 4; for national averages see













Name of Company in 1912 



























J&P Coats (Viyella acq 1986)
Central Leather (liquidated 1952)
American Woolen (Textron acq 1955










1  Defined as all non-government enterprises with more than 50% of their activity in mining and manufacturing.
2      ie 31 May 1995 equity capitalisation, revalued at 1912 Stock Exchange prices by the Standard & Poor ‘industiral
   500’ index, divided by 1912 equity market value.
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Coal Mining
 23 F Mines de Lens (Charbonnages de France) 94  0*
 28 F Mines de Bruay (nat. 1945) 87 (0)
 29 G Gelsenkirchener (Ruhrkohle/RWE acq. 1968/9) 86 (0.2)
 47 F Mines de Courrières (nat. 1945)  55 (0)
 61 F Mines d’Anzin (nat. 1945)  47 (0)
 72 G Harpener Bergbau (VEW acq.1992)  38 (0.1)
 91 US Pittsburgh Coal (Continental acq.1966) 31 (1.0)
Mechanical Engineering
  4 US Pullman (Wheelabrator-Frye acq.1980) 200 (0.1)
  8 US Singer (Bicoastal) 173 0*
 10 US International Harvester (Navistar) 160 0.1
 21 US Westinghouse Air Brake (American Standard acq. 1968) 102 (0.1)
 36 US John Deere 70* 0.9
 50 US American Car & Foundry (Icahn acq.1984) 52 (0.3)
 64 R Briansk Rail & Engineering (nat.1917) 45 (0)
 79 US American Locomotive (Worthington acq. 1964) 37 (0)
 88 US Baldwin Locomotive (Armour acq.1965) 32 (0.1)
 95 UK Metropolitan Carriage (Vickers acq. 1919) 27 (1.9)
Non-Ferrous Metals and Other Mining (including related refining and smelting)
  6 US Anaconda (Arco acq. 1977) 178 (0.2)
 12 SA De Beers 158  0.3
13(88) UK Rio Tinto (RTZ) 148  0.8
 18 US Utah Copper & Nevada Consolidated (Kennecott acq. 1923-33) 116 (1.1)
 22 US Phelps Dodge 95  0.3
 25 US American Smelting (Asarco)  92  0.1
 42 SA Rand Mines 65  0.0
 43 SA Crown Mines (Rand Mines acq. 1968) 63  (0)
 45 US International Nickel (Inco) 57  0.4
 54 US Calumet & Hecla (Universal Oil acq. 1968)  51 (0.1)
 60 UK Consolidated Goldfields (Hanson acq. 1989)  47 (1.6)
 70 US National Lead (NL Industries)  39  0.2 
 83 US US Smelting R&M (Sharon acq. 1979)  34 (0.2)
 86 SA E Rand Proprietary   33  0.0
Iron, Steel and Heavy Industrial3
  1 US US Steel (USX Marathon) 741 0.1
 14 G Krupp 130* 0.2
 38 G Phoenix (Thyssen acq. 1963) 67 (0.1)
 46 US American Can (Travelers) 57 1.9
 48 G Deutsch-Luxemburg (V.St.acq. 1926) 55 (0)
 49 G Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser (Thyssen) 54 0.9
 51 UK Vickers 52 0.2
 65 US Pennsylvania Steel (Bethlehem acq. 1916) 43* (0.5)
 67 UK Armstrong-Whitworth (bankrupt 1926) 41 (0)
 71 F Schneider 39 1.0
 77 R Russo-Belge (nat. 1917) 37 (0)
 80 G Hohenlohe (dismembered and liquidated 1921-1939) 36 (0)
 81 Lux Arbed 35 (0.2)
 89 G Mannesmann 32 2.7
 90 G Gutehoffnungshütte (MAN) 32* 1.0
 93 US Crucible Steel (Colt acq. 1968) 30 (0.3)
 96 US Republic Iron & Steel (LTV acq.1984) 27 (0.5)




 9 US American Tobacco (American Brands) 169 0.4
11 (38) UK British-American Tobacco (BAT Industries) 159 1.3
 15 (44) US Eastman Kodak 128 1.3
 16 US Armour (Greyhound acq. 1970) 126* (0.1)
 17 UK Imperial Tobacco (Hanson acq.1986) 120 (0.5)
 19 US American Sugar (Tate & Lyle acq.1988) 110 (0.1)
 20 (75) UK Guinness 109 1.2
 27 (19) UK Lever Brothers (Unilever)   87 3.4
 30 US US Rubber (Uniroyal)   80  0*
 31 US BF Goodrich    75  0.2
 32 US Swift (Beatrice acq. 1984)   75 (1.0)
 34 US National Biscuit (RJR acq. 1985)   72 (1.8)
 44 US Liggett & Myers (Grandmet acq.1980)   58 (0.4)
 52 (10) US Procter & Gamble   51 8.1
 66 US P. Lorillard (Loews acq. 1968)   42 (0.7)
 75 UK Reckitt & Sons (Reckitt & Colman)   38 1.0
 87 US Corn Products (CPC International)    33 2.3
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 97 US Cudahy Packing (General Host acq.1968)   26* (0.1)
Chemicals5
 37 (20) US Du Pont (+ Hercules + ICI acq. Atlas 1971) 69* 7.2
 53 (94) G Farbwerke v. L & B (Hoechst)  51 2.0
 57 (85) UK Brunner Mond (Zeneca) 49 2.4
 62 (67) G Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (Bayer)  45 3.0
 63 (95) G BASF 45     2.3
 73 US American Agricultural (Continental acq. 1963) 38 (0.2)
 76 US Virginia-Carolina (Mobil acq. 1963) 38 (0.2)
 84 F St. Gobain 33 2.5
 85 B Solvay 33* 1.1
 92 US General Chemical (Allied-Signal)  30 3.1
Electrical Engineering
  7 (2) US General Electric 174 4.7
 24 G AEG (Daimler-Benz acq. 1985)   93  (0.3)
 39 US Westinghouse Electric    67  0.7
 41 (32) G Siemens   65  3.4
 59 US Western Electric (Lucent+Northern Telecom) 47*  4.7
Petroleum
  2 (3) US Jersey Standard (Exxon) 390 1.9
  5 (1) N/UK Royal Dutch Shell 187 4.8
 26 (22) US Indiana Standard (Amoco)  88 3.2
 33 (14) US New York Standard (Mobil)   73 4.4
 35 US California Standard (Chevron)  71 3.7
 40 US Ohio Oil (US Steel acq. 1982)   66* (3.5)
 55 US Prairie Oil & Gas (Sinclair acq.1932)  50 (0.3)
 56 Mex El Aguila (Shell acq. 1919)   50 (2.4)
 58 R Nobel Bros (nat 1917, rump dissolved 1959)  48 (0)
 74 (16) UK Burmah Oil (Burmah Castrol + BP)  38  9.1
 78 US Mexican Petroleum (PNP acq. 1919)  37 (2.3)
 94 (58) US Texas Co (Texaco)   29    5.2
 98 (52) US Atlantic Refining (Arco)   26 5.9
 99 US Vacuum Oil (NY Standard acq. 1931)  26 (5.1)
   
3  Many firms in this category included vertically integrated coal mines and shipbuilding yards in 1912.
4  in addition to the core food, drink and tobacco industry, this category includes branded household chemicals,   
rubber tyres and photographic goods.
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5 This category includes St. Gobain, which in 1912 (as now) was mainly a glass producer, though in 1912 it also  
 had a major interest in chemicals.
APPENDIX B
Sources for Table 5
USA 1913.  Inferred from Chandler (1962)
1932.  Chandler (1962) and based on 50 companies, but with no multidivisionals
in the next 50 assumed.
1950-80.  Percentages estimated from the chart in Kogut and Anderson (1993),
p.190, based on 150 firms - this may underestimate multidivisionals in the top 100.
However, Rumelt (1974) basing his study on samples of 183-207 of the top 500
firms, suggests figures of 20% for 1949, 50% for 1959 and 77% for 1969, which
rather surprisingly implies no greater propensity to adopt multidivisional
organisation among very large than among more moderately-sized corporations, at
least after the war.
Japan 1913-32 inferred from Morikawa (1992), pp.113-4.
1950-80 Suzuki (1991), based on 114 companies.  He has a category “mixed
functional and divisional”, half of which I have allocated to the multidivisional
category.  Kono (1980) p.80 gives very similar results, though cf. Fruin (1992) for
the view that multidivisionals were not so common in Japan as these figures imply.
Germany 1913 “at least one”, ie Siemens, in Kocka (1978), p.577.
1950-70. Dyas and Thanheiser (1976).
1980. Grossing up of the figures for 48 firms in Cable and Dirrheimer (1980),
p.46.
France 1912 Levy-Leboyer 1980 (but cf. Daviet 1988).
1932.  Fridenson 1994.
1950-70. Dyas and Thanheiser (1976) pp.186-7.
1980.  Approximation based on the trend line in Kogut and Anderson (1993),
p.193, though it is hard to discern how that table has been calibrated.
Italy 1950-70. Pavan (1970) p.67, percentages based on 6/84 firms in 1950, 16/94 in
1960 and 48/100 in 1970.
UK 1913 inferred from Hannah (1976).
1932. Hannah (1976), based on approximately 50 companies, with the assumption
that lower-ranked companies did not adopt the multidivisional structure, as for the
USA at that date.
1950-70.  Channon (1972) p.67, percentages based on 12/92 in 1950, 29/96 in
1960, 72/100 in 1970.
1980.  Approximation based on the trend line in Kogut and Anderson (1993),
p.193, though it is hard to determine how that table has been calibrated.
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